<p>This paper re-examines phenomenological accounts of autism in light of the double empathy theory. I fully endorse the compelling critique by contemporary phenomenologists such as Gallagher, Fuchs, and Zahavi of the Theory of Mind framework, as they ground autistic social difficulties in impairments of primary and secondary intersubjectivity. However, their analyses tend to underemphasize or overlook the reciprocal structure of empathy, an aspect that is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of autistic-allistic social interactions. This omission has been rightly criticized by proponents of the double empathy theory, such as Rizzo and Ekdahl, who emphasize that social breakdowns between autistic and allistic individuals are bidirectional. Drawing on Husserl’s classical phenomenology of empathy, I argue that a deeper phenomenological understanding reveals empathy to be inherently reciprocal and co-constituted. Thus, Husserlian phenomenology not only aligns with the core insights of the double empathy theory but also offers a conceptual foundation for rethinking autistic experience beyond unidirectional deficit models.</p>