<p>In this paper I analyze the phenomenon of normalizing and tabooing menstrual pain as an example of epistemic injustice. I refer to both types of epistemic injustice distinguished by Miranda Fricker: testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice. The social approach to the phenomenon of menstrual pain combines both. This poses a significant political and bioethical problem, as ignoring and misunderstanding the experiences of menstrual pain sufferers can contribute to delayed diagnosis and reinforce patients’ sense of loneliness.</p>

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Menstrual pain and epistemic injustice

  • Adriana Joanna Mickiewicz

摘要

In this paper I analyze the phenomenon of normalizing and tabooing menstrual pain as an example of epistemic injustice. I refer to both types of epistemic injustice distinguished by Miranda Fricker: testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice. The social approach to the phenomenon of menstrual pain combines both. This poses a significant political and bioethical problem, as ignoring and misunderstanding the experiences of menstrual pain sufferers can contribute to delayed diagnosis and reinforce patients’ sense of loneliness.