<p>This paper advocates for an “evolutionary turn” in the philosophy of technology, emphasizing the biological dimension of our relation to technology. Rather than replacing the well-established empirical turn, this approach aims to enrich it by addressing overlooked aspects of the role played by technology in human evolution. First, I argue that adopting an evolutionary viewpoint strengthens the relationship between philosophy and scientific practice by both necessitating analyses that align with up-to-date scientific paradigms like the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis and scrutinizing how technologies also constitute scientific insights into our evolution. Second, I show that technology shapes human biology even today and, therefore, this perspective also contributes to elucidating current debates about technological interventions in the human lifeform and the biopolitical implications of our evolutionary self-representations. Third, I emphasize the limitations of the human–technology relations approach exemplified by postphenomenology and, by drawing on Stiegler’s “general organology,” I propose to reconceptualize the human lifeform as the evolving negotiation between biological organs, technologies and social organizations and their historically situated reconstruction.</p>

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The evolutionary turn in the philosophy of technology

  • Marco Pavanini

摘要

This paper advocates for an “evolutionary turn” in the philosophy of technology, emphasizing the biological dimension of our relation to technology. Rather than replacing the well-established empirical turn, this approach aims to enrich it by addressing overlooked aspects of the role played by technology in human evolution. First, I argue that adopting an evolutionary viewpoint strengthens the relationship between philosophy and scientific practice by both necessitating analyses that align with up-to-date scientific paradigms like the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis and scrutinizing how technologies also constitute scientific insights into our evolution. Second, I show that technology shapes human biology even today and, therefore, this perspective also contributes to elucidating current debates about technological interventions in the human lifeform and the biopolitical implications of our evolutionary self-representations. Third, I emphasize the limitations of the human–technology relations approach exemplified by postphenomenology and, by drawing on Stiegler’s “general organology,” I propose to reconceptualize the human lifeform as the evolving negotiation between biological organs, technologies and social organizations and their historically situated reconstruction.