This paper reconstructs Paci’s neglected phenomenological account of need, illustrating its role in his project of a “new phenomenology.” While peripheral in most phenomenological authors, the theme of need becomes central in Paci’s approach, representing the main tool for reshaping the nature and aims of phenomenology. I begin by illustrating the main features of Paci’s approach, in Sect. 2.1, then I move on to discuss, in Sect. 2.2, how he connects concepts like epoché and the mundane-transcendental distinction to the problem of alienation, thus proposing phenomenology as an emancipatory practice. This lays the groundwork for Paci’s anchoring of Marxism within phenomenology, of which his theory of need represents the major theoretical result. As I argue in Sect. 3.1, this theory serves to ground economics in the subject’s operations in the lifeworld and overcome the major blind spots in both Husserl and Marx’s theories. Thus, I demonstrate how an analysis of need is designed to clarify phenomenologically Marx’s concept of “economic structure,” in an anti-objectivist way. Finally, in Sect. 3.2, I turn to Paci’s description of need in terms of negative intentionality, showing why it brings to light a deeper level of subjectivity and lifeworld and how it is useful to develop critical analyses of factual social arrangements, in line with Paci’s overall approach to phenomenology.
