<p>Influenced by Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann’s 1926 <i>Ethics</i> theorizes an “axiological” dimension of Being populated by ideal objects he calls “values.” Like mathematical objects, they are essentially atemporal and immaterial, but they can be “actualized” in the spatio-temporal world. Truths about them and their hierarchical order are objective, and we can have a priori knowledge of them. In sensing values, we apprehend their “Ought-to-be,” a metaphysical tension which constitutes their “axiological” character. We apprehend them with a unique faculty of “value-feeling,” which is irreducible to the intellect and includes an indispensable affective component. Within this framework, I offer an account of why and how art is uniquely equipped to disclose moral values. I contend that while moral values inhere only in persons and their acts, artifacts can disclose moral values whether or not they actualize them. Representational artifacts, I argue, do this primarily by facilitating acts of imagination whose objects instantiate moral values. After an important interlude on the role of affectivity in acts of value-feeling, I proceed to account for two major ways in which non-representational art can aid in the disclosure of moral values: namely, by simulating the affective states appropriate to their apprehension, and/or by bearing similar properties to them. Finally, I consider three major potential objections to my position.</p>