<p>Wittgenstein was linked to many philosophers of variegated backgrounds. And yet, the encounter with Bergson is a challenge which still largely lies ahead for Wittgensteinian scholarship. This should change because these two authors can fruitfully illuminate each other. I propose two lines along which their philosophies should be compared. The first consists in the anti-theoretical methodology. Whereas Wittgenstein is more explicit in his belief that philosophy should advance no theses, I trace this idea as also being an essential impetus for Bergson’s thought. Wittgenstein applies this method mainly to rules, the central issue of his later philosophy. Though Bergson typically focuses on very different kinds of rules than Wittgenstein, I show that both authors ultimately converge on a similar understanding of what rules are and how we live with them. Rather than formulating our rules, explaining them or justifying them, we end up merely observing the dynamics of their interplay. Their take on rules is the second main line of my comparative study. Using the observations on rules, we get back to the first line, as we can see that their methodology is meant to warn us not to try to reduce phenomena to each other. Rather, we should simply observe and appreciate them. All these common tenets indicate that their philosophies, though very original, stem from a very acute and reasonable sense of inadequacy regarding the common ways of doing philosophy and remain very much alive in philosophy and beyond.</p>