<p>“Critical phenomenology” is a method that integrates a critical perspective—in the vein of critical theories of race, disability, gender, etc.—with phenomenology. However, this approach has sometimes been accompanied by attempts to distance “critical” from “classical” phenomenology, obfuscating critical perspectives already inherent in early phenomenological works. I argue that a basic tension within phenomenology, between experiential contents and their structures, still informs current debates. Further, the work to recognize institutional oppressions and individual effects is not just a current concern, but one already analyzed—and debated—amongst early phenomenologists. I look first to selections from Sartre, de Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, and Husserl to demonstrate how some early phenomenologists were addressing contemporary concerns. While doing so, I introduce Husserl’s different phenomenological methods as a means to interpret their approaches. Then, I address some issues that arise through a distinction between “critical” and “classical” phenomenology by pointing to the critical potential of classical phenomenology.</p>