CEO turnover and provisioning practices in Indian private banks
摘要
Using quarterly data spanning 2011–2022, this study investigates how staggered CEO turnovers in Indian private sector banks causally affect provisioning and risk-taking. Exploiting exogenous variation arising from mandatory retirement rules that require CEOs to step down after either 15 years in office or upon reaching 70 years, the analysis isolates the quasi-random timing of leadership transitions. This staggered structure provides a clean difference-in-differences setting for causal inference. The results show that incoming CEOs of banks with weaker asset quality or capital buffers adopt more conservative provisioning, consistent with transparency and capital-management motives. Yet this conservatism is more pronounced and risk-enhancing among new private banks than old ones. While the findings illuminate how leadership transitions shape prudential behaviour in emerging-market settings with evolving governance, their generalisability beyond such institutional contexts warrants caution.