Interdependence in Public-Private Partnerships has long been overlooked in the literature due to its contractually stagnant nature. However, in the sovereign sector of extractive industries, interdependence is more dynamic and salient in Public-Private Joint Ventures (PPJVs), despite contractual stipulations. This dynamic interdependence results in managerial challenges and asymmetrical powers experienced by appointed public and private managers—both between themselves and with their respective parent firms. The tensions arising from these power asymmetries dictate managerial practices and influence how managers govern PPJVs. Adopting a network management lens, this study addresses the perceived managerial practices that influence PPJV governance under power asymmetries experienced by appointed managers. Qualitative empirical data was gathered through interviews with experienced public and private managers in the Egyptian extractive industry. The findings reveal four key practices across two levels of exchange. At the inter-organizational level, two practices were identified: Trust-Building, which all participants reported as mutually important for governing PPJVs, and Experience Compatibility, where participants showed contrasting views on its importance. At the intra-organizational level, two practices emerged: PPJV management autonomy and PPJV management appointment stability, both of which all participants identified as mutually important for governing PPJVs. This study offers both refinement and extension to the existing network management framework. First, it refines the inter-organizational exchange component by focusing on jointly operating entities and analysing the perspectives of appointed managers within PPJVs. Second, it extends the framework by incorporating intra-organizational exchange—a vertical level of exchange between appointed managers and their parent firms that has been largely neglected in PPJV management and governance literature. The study’s contribution lies in providing a managerial lens moderated by power asymmetries, offering a departure from structural/economic and contractual arguments while complementing the literature on PPP management, governance, and organization studies. Current literature has acknowledged the importance of managerial practices but has provided limited evidence of their micro-foundations. This study addresses this gap by examining partnerships rooted in tensions arising from unbalanced power dynamics that only appointed managers experience as a consequence of interdependence—both between each other and between them and their respective parent firms.

Public-private joint ventures: internalizing governance through the consequences of interdependence

期刊论文
发表日期：

2026年1月27日

查看全文

Khaled Kesseba

摘要

Interdependence in Public-Private Partnerships has long been overlooked in the literature due to its contractually stagnant nature. However, in the sovereign sector of extractive industries, interdependence is more dynamic and salient in Public-Private Joint Ventures (PPJVs), despite contractual stipulations. This dynamic interdependence results in managerial challenges and asymmetrical powers experienced by appointed public and private managers—both between themselves and with their respective parent firms. The tensions arising from these power asymmetries dictate managerial practices and influence how managers govern PPJVs. Adopting a network management lens, this study addresses the perceived managerial practices that influence PPJV governance under power asymmetries experienced by appointed managers. Qualitative empirical data was gathered through interviews with experienced public and private managers in the Egyptian extractive industry. The findings reveal four key practices across two levels of exchange. At the inter-organizational level, two practices were identified: Trust-Building, which all participants reported as mutually important for governing PPJVs, and Experience Compatibility, where participants showed contrasting views on its importance. At the intra-organizational level, two practices emerged: PPJV management autonomy and PPJV management appointment stability, both of which all participants identified as mutually important for governing PPJVs. This study offers both refinement and extension to the existing network management framework. First, it refines the inter-organizational exchange component by focusing on jointly operating entities and analysing the perspectives of appointed managers within PPJVs. Second, it extends the framework by incorporating intra-organizational exchange—a vertical level of exchange between appointed managers and their parent firms that has been largely neglected in PPJV management and governance literature. The study’s contribution lies in providing a managerial lens moderated by power asymmetries, offering a departure from structural/economic and contractual arguments while complementing the literature on PPP management, governance, and organization studies. Current literature has acknowledged the importance of managerial practices but has provided limited evidence of their micro-foundations. This study addresses this gap by examining partnerships rooted in tensions arising from unbalanced power dynamics that only appointed managers experience as a consequence of interdependence—both between each other and between them and their respective parent firms.