<p>This study investigates whether founder-chief executive officer (founder-CEO) presence is associated with initial public offering (IPO) survival. Using 1,393 IPOs listed on Japanese junior stock markets, we examine the impact of founder-CEO presence on the time to involuntary delisting, voluntary delisting, and graduation from junior stock markets. We find that while founder-CEO-led firms are less likely to voluntarily delist through mergers and acquisitions (M&amp;A) and buyouts, they are more likely to graduate to the main stock markets than non-founder-CEO-led firms. These findings suggest that founder-CEO-led firms have ambitions to advance beyond the IPO, despite their resistance to delisting through M&amp;A and buyouts. Additionally, while younger firms are more likely to delist, regardless of whether it is involuntary or voluntary, they are less likely to graduate from junior stock markets. Furthermore, firms with CEO retention after an IPO are less likely to involuntarily and voluntarily delist, while they are more likely to graduate from junior stock markets.</p>

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Founder-CEO resistance and ambition: An empirical analysis of firm survival in Japanese junior stock markets

  • Yuji Honjo,
  • Yuya Ikeda,
  • Koki Kurihara

摘要

This study investigates whether founder-chief executive officer (founder-CEO) presence is associated with initial public offering (IPO) survival. Using 1,393 IPOs listed on Japanese junior stock markets, we examine the impact of founder-CEO presence on the time to involuntary delisting, voluntary delisting, and graduation from junior stock markets. We find that while founder-CEO-led firms are less likely to voluntarily delist through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and buyouts, they are more likely to graduate to the main stock markets than non-founder-CEO-led firms. These findings suggest that founder-CEO-led firms have ambitions to advance beyond the IPO, despite their resistance to delisting through M&A and buyouts. Additionally, while younger firms are more likely to delist, regardless of whether it is involuntary or voluntary, they are less likely to graduate from junior stock markets. Furthermore, firms with CEO retention after an IPO are less likely to involuntarily and voluntarily delist, while they are more likely to graduate from junior stock markets.