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<p><i>Probabilism</i>—the doctrine that ideally rational <i>degrees of belief</i> conform to the calculus of probabilities—is habitually defended by citing Dutch-book and accuracy-dominance arguments. Yet these arguments rely on premises that are not plausibly necessary truths. I argue that the premises in question can be understood as fixing a convention. Relaxing these premises leads to alternative calculi which—under permissive though not universal assumptions—are intertranslatable with the probability calculus. This applies to Dutch-book and accuracy-dominance arguments alike; a mathematical correspondence is shown to hold between them.</p>

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Probability by Convention

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月4日

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  • Youness Ayaita

摘要

Probabilism—the doctrine that ideally rational degrees of belief conform to the calculus of probabilities—is habitually defended by citing Dutch-book and accuracy-dominance arguments. Yet these arguments rely on premises that are not plausibly necessary truths. I argue that the premises in question can be understood as fixing a convention. Relaxing these premises leads to alternative calculi which—under permissive though not universal assumptions—are intertranslatable with the probability calculus. This applies to Dutch-book and accuracy-dominance arguments alike; a mathematical correspondence is shown to hold between them.