<p>This study investigates the effects of internationalized constituent power on Bosnia and Herzegovina, analyzing how its externally imposed constitutional framework has shaped political stability, ethnic relations, state functionality, and democratization. Drawing on a qualitative methodology, the research integrates case studies and constitutional analysis to assess the efficacy of Bosnia’s constitutional model, with particular attention to the influence of international law, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the Dayton Agreement. The findings reveal that while international intervention initially bolstered stability and human rights protections, its phased withdrawal has enabled entrenched political elites to obstruct essential reforms. Persistent ethnonationalist dominance and constitutional ambiguities continue to hinder democratization, weaken state institutions, and challenge compliance with ECtHR rulings. The resulting friction between Bosnia’s constitutional structure and European human rights norms has deepened political fragmentation, especially in electoral and governance mechanisms. This paper critically evaluates Bosnia’s reliance on international oversight, illuminating the risks of prolonged external involvement in post-conflict governance. It contributes to the broader discourse on whether internationalized constitution-making promotes sustainable democracy or entrenches institutional stagnation and ethnic divisions, advocating for constitutional reforms to enhance political inclusivity and legal coherence while addressing the shortcomings of international interventions in domestic governance.</p>