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<p>In this paper, I introduce the notion of <i>insinuative reference</i> and offer an account of the phenomenon it describes. In <i>insinuative reference</i>, speakers use demonstratives such that they have an innocuous possible referent and a less innocuous referent. The speaker intends for the hearer to recognise the less innocuous referent as a semantic value of the demonstrative in question. Yet, they also intend to preserve plausible deniability regarding that intention. Insinuative reference is often used to bring up politically taboo or otherwise offensive content with relative strangers and thus to undermine and avoid norms against such content. Analysing it is a form of ‘non-ideal philosophy of language’ as advocated by Beaver and Stanley. In the paper, I distinguish insinuative reference from insinuation proper (as described by Camp) and from over dogwhistling. I further describe how it poses a <i>prima facie</i> challenge to King’s “coordination account” of demonstratives. I show that this challenge can be met once we realise that speakers can have differing conceptions of reasonableness. In successful insinuative reference both interlocutors in fact accept that any reasonable hearer would recognise the speaker’s intention, yet this is not part of the common ground.</p>

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Insinuative reference and the coordination account

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月22日

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  • Milan Ney

摘要

In this paper, I introduce the notion of insinuative reference and offer an account of the phenomenon it describes. In insinuative reference, speakers use demonstratives such that they have an innocuous possible referent and a less innocuous referent. The speaker intends for the hearer to recognise the less innocuous referent as a semantic value of the demonstrative in question. Yet, they also intend to preserve plausible deniability regarding that intention. Insinuative reference is often used to bring up politically taboo or otherwise offensive content with relative strangers and thus to undermine and avoid norms against such content. Analysing it is a form of ‘non-ideal philosophy of language’ as advocated by Beaver and Stanley. In the paper, I distinguish insinuative reference from insinuation proper (as described by Camp) and from over dogwhistling. I further describe how it poses a prima facie challenge to King’s “coordination account” of demonstratives. I show that this challenge can be met once we realise that speakers can have differing conceptions of reasonableness. In successful insinuative reference both interlocutors in fact accept that any reasonable hearer would recognise the speaker’s intention, yet this is not part of the common ground.