<p>The article introduces a counterintuitive argument, contending that jury disagreement on the defendant’s guilt—a nonunanimous conviction—may well provide a more informative signal, compared to consensus. Because stronger consensus implies higher likelihood of herding, it is shown that beyond some threshold, further accumulation of votes to convict would carry negligible epistemic contribution, barely enhancing the posterior probability of guilt. On the other hand, while dissenting votes provide a direct signal of innocence, they indicate that herding has not been involved in the decision-making process, hence increase the epistemic contribution of any vote generated by said process—including votes to convict—and may thus offer an indirect signal of <i>guilt</i>, potentially increasing the posterior. This unravels the informational value of dissent and the possible disadvantageousness of consensus.</p>

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Informative Jury Disagreement

  • Roy Baharad

摘要

The article introduces a counterintuitive argument, contending that jury disagreement on the defendant’s guilt—a nonunanimous conviction—may well provide a more informative signal, compared to consensus. Because stronger consensus implies higher likelihood of herding, it is shown that beyond some threshold, further accumulation of votes to convict would carry negligible epistemic contribution, barely enhancing the posterior probability of guilt. On the other hand, while dissenting votes provide a direct signal of innocence, they indicate that herding has not been involved in the decision-making process, hence increase the epistemic contribution of any vote generated by said process—including votes to convict—and may thus offer an indirect signal of guilt, potentially increasing the posterior. This unravels the informational value of dissent and the possible disadvantageousness of consensus.