<p>This paper critically reassesses Walter Benjamin’s concept of divine violence, arguing that its radical openness, often invoked as a source of revolutionary potential, renders it vulnerable to the justificatory logics it is meant to overcome. Drawing on major theorists including Derrida, Butler, Agamben, and Žižek, as well as commentators who attempt to apply the concept to contemporary political struggles, the paper shows that the instability of divine violence is not only interpretive but structural. Although its appeal lies in the promise of a rupture from law and mythic violence, efforts to refine or enact the concept often reproduce the frameworks it seeks to escape. Through close analysis of both theoretical debates and case studies, including feminist occupations in Chile and lynching in Mexico, the paper demonstrates that divine violence fails to operate as a conceptually coherent or ethically secure framework for revolutionary justice. This analysis raises fundamental questions about whether the concept can be sustained as a meaningful category in political and legal theory, or whether its indeterminacy and ethical precariousness ultimately undermine its critical usefulness.</p>