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<p>Based on resource dependence theory and social network theory, this study examines the impact of two types of director network structures on corporate patent transactions and their boundary conditions using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2023. First, we find that the centrality of the director network significantly promotes patent purchases, while structural holes exhibit a U-shaped effect on patent purchases. Second, both network centrality and structural holes positively influence patent sales. Third, we further explore the moderating mechanisms by which director networks affect firms’ patent transactions. Specifically, in terms of patent purchases, technological competition negatively moderates the positive relationship between the centrality of the director network and patent purchases while positively moderating the U-shaped relationship between structural holes and patent purchases. In terms of patent sales, technological competition negatively moderates the positive effects of network centrality on patent sales, yet it cannot moderate the positive effect of structural holes on patent sales. This paper enriches the research on expanding corporate patent trading partners through director networks. The findings provide some references for firms to optimize patent transaction strategies.</p>

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Facilitating corporate patent transactions: the effect of director networks and the moderating role of technological competition

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年8月30日

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  • Lulu Lin,
  • Huaqi Chai,
  • Xiaodong Geng,
  • Wenbo Jiang

摘要

Based on resource dependence theory and social network theory, this study examines the impact of two types of director network structures on corporate patent transactions and their boundary conditions using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2023. First, we find that the centrality of the director network significantly promotes patent purchases, while structural holes exhibit a U-shaped effect on patent purchases. Second, both network centrality and structural holes positively influence patent sales. Third, we further explore the moderating mechanisms by which director networks affect firms’ patent transactions. Specifically, in terms of patent purchases, technological competition negatively moderates the positive relationship between the centrality of the director network and patent purchases while positively moderating the U-shaped relationship between structural holes and patent purchases. In terms of patent sales, technological competition negatively moderates the positive effects of network centrality on patent sales, yet it cannot moderate the positive effect of structural holes on patent sales. This paper enriches the research on expanding corporate patent trading partners through director networks. The findings provide some references for firms to optimize patent transaction strategies.