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<p>For cooperative games, the Shapley value is the most eminent allocation rule that represents the economic rationality, and the solidarity value takes into account social and psychological aspects. The (communication) graph game was developed by Myerson (1977), and the well-known Myerson value is the Shapley value for graph games. In this paper we propose the graph solidarity value for graph games, in which a player’s payoff is derived from the solidarity worths of connected coalitions and the surplus of components. We also recall the graph egalitarian value introduced by Béal et al. (2012) by giving different characteristic properties, from which we see that the graph solidarity value lies between the Myerson value and the graph egalitarian value.</p>

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Solidarity Value for Graph Games

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月26日

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  • Daniel Li,
  • Erfang Shan

摘要

For cooperative games, the Shapley value is the most eminent allocation rule that represents the economic rationality, and the solidarity value takes into account social and psychological aspects. The (communication) graph game was developed by Myerson (1977), and the well-known Myerson value is the Shapley value for graph games. In this paper we propose the graph solidarity value for graph games, in which a player’s payoff is derived from the solidarity worths of connected coalitions and the surplus of components. We also recall the graph egalitarian value introduced by Béal et al. (2012) by giving different characteristic properties, from which we see that the graph solidarity value lies between the Myerson value and the graph egalitarian value.