<p>Cognitive distortions are routinely described in cognitive-behavioral (CBT) and rational-emotive behavior (REBT) therapies as “errors in logic” or “illogical thinking.” While this terminology is pedagogically convenient, it often obscures a crucial conceptual distinction between violations of <i>logical inference</i> and problems related to the justification, scope, or evaluative force of belief content. In this paper, we do not claim that this distinction is novel within logic or philosophy. Rather, it argues that, despite its familiarity in formal disciplines, it is not consistently preserved in the language and practice of CBT and REBT, where “logical error” is frequently used in a broader and theoretically imprecise way. As a result, clinically relevant forms of distorted thinking are often mischaracterized as failures of inference rather than as instances of unjustified or overextended premises. Using <i>syllogistic</i> reconstruction as a descriptive tool, we show that many cognitive distortions preserve <i>inferential validity</i> while failing at the level of justification and proportionality, for example, because the underlying beliefs are too absolute, too sweeping, or not well supported by available evidence. Drawing on insights from <i>paraconsistent logic</i>, we further argue that human reasoning can tolerate limited inconsistency without collapsing into irrationality. Clarifying these distinctions has implications for theory, clinical communication, and cognitive restructuring. Specifically, it suggests that therapeutic interventions may be more precise and collaborative when they focus on examining and revising problematic premises rather than framing clients’ reasoning as logically defective.</p>