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<p>Urban regeneration has emerged as a critical strategy for addressing housing shortages and spatial inefficiencies in rapidly urbanizing megacities. However, many urban regeneration approaches are market-driven and often prioritize economic growth over social equity, leading to persistent gaps in affordable housing delivery. This study investigates the institutional barriers to affordable housing provision in Shenzhen, China—a pioneer in market-oriented urban regeneration—through a neo-institutional economics (NIE) lens. Combining policy analysis and 26 semi-structured interviews with government officials, developers, and residents, the research identifies three interconnected institutional obstacles: (1) ambiguous property rights rooted in the rural-urban dual land system, which prolongs negotiation and approval processes; (2) high transaction costs arising from fragmented governance and bureaucratic complexities; and (3) misaligned incentives among stakeholders that prioritize commercial gains over public welfare. Empirical findings reveal that over 80% of urban village regeneration projects face delays exceeding one year due to tenure disputes, while 70% of developers spatially marginalize affordable housing to maximize profits. These dynamics form a self-reinforcing “institutional trap,” where path dependency on land-finance regimes and weak regulatory constraints perpetuate housing inequity. The study contributes to urban scholarship by adapting insights from New Institutional Economics into an integrative tripartite analytical lens (“institutional structure–transaction costs–behavioural choices”, STB) that traces cascading transaction costs across project stages and links them to actors’ strategic, normative and reputational behaviours in Shenzhen’s market-driven regeneration regime. It challenges the assumption that market efficiency aligns with social goals and underscores the need for institutional reforms to reconcile growth with equity. Policymakers must address structural contradictions, such as rigid land ownership regimes and decentralized governance, to break the low-equilibrium trap. The findings hold global relevance for megacities grappling with similar tensions between market-driven regeneration and inclusive development.</p>

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Market-driven urban regeneration and affordable housing: unpacking institutional barriers in Shenzhen

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月29日

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  • Shiyu Wang,
  • Joris Hoekstra,
  • Marja Elsinga

摘要

Urban regeneration has emerged as a critical strategy for addressing housing shortages and spatial inefficiencies in rapidly urbanizing megacities. However, many urban regeneration approaches are market-driven and often prioritize economic growth over social equity, leading to persistent gaps in affordable housing delivery. This study investigates the institutional barriers to affordable housing provision in Shenzhen, China—a pioneer in market-oriented urban regeneration—through a neo-institutional economics (NIE) lens. Combining policy analysis and 26 semi-structured interviews with government officials, developers, and residents, the research identifies three interconnected institutional obstacles: (1) ambiguous property rights rooted in the rural-urban dual land system, which prolongs negotiation and approval processes; (2) high transaction costs arising from fragmented governance and bureaucratic complexities; and (3) misaligned incentives among stakeholders that prioritize commercial gains over public welfare. Empirical findings reveal that over 80% of urban village regeneration projects face delays exceeding one year due to tenure disputes, while 70% of developers spatially marginalize affordable housing to maximize profits. These dynamics form a self-reinforcing “institutional trap,” where path dependency on land-finance regimes and weak regulatory constraints perpetuate housing inequity. The study contributes to urban scholarship by adapting insights from New Institutional Economics into an integrative tripartite analytical lens (“institutional structure–transaction costs–behavioural choices”, STB) that traces cascading transaction costs across project stages and links them to actors’ strategic, normative and reputational behaviours in Shenzhen’s market-driven regeneration regime. It challenges the assumption that market efficiency aligns with social goals and underscores the need for institutional reforms to reconcile growth with equity. Policymakers must address structural contradictions, such as rigid land ownership regimes and decentralized governance, to break the low-equilibrium trap. The findings hold global relevance for megacities grappling with similar tensions between market-driven regeneration and inclusive development.