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<p>This study investigates the problem of achieving International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) by focusing on specific normative properties. We model a world comprising <i>n</i> asymmetric countries. Each country produces goods and services, thereby generating private welfare and negative externalities affecting all countries. Based on a cost-benefit analysis, each state determines its production level and decides voluntarily on its participation in a coalition. Our analysis of the standard static non-cooperative game-theoretic model of coalition formation demonstrates that, under the resulting economic scenario, neither per-capita nor average envy-freeness properties are guaranteed. To foster more equitable cooperation, we define new coalition-formation rules wherein coalesced players maximize the joint utility function subject to constraints that prevent envy. By examining the particular case of a two-country world, we show that, by imposing a suitable aggregate emissions cap, the resulting economic scenario induces a balance of production among agents, thereby generating social equity. The analysis is extended through numerical simulations for a ten-country setting. The results indicate that, while self-enforcing agreements are typically limited to small coalitions, the introduction of equity considerations within the coalition structure significantly increases the number of stable coalitions compared to those obtained in the standard setting.</p>

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From individual welfare to global equity: reforming International Environmental Agreements

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月17日

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  • Imma Lory Aprea,
  • Chiara Donnini,
  • Armando Sacco

摘要

This study investigates the problem of achieving International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) by focusing on specific normative properties. We model a world comprising n asymmetric countries. Each country produces goods and services, thereby generating private welfare and negative externalities affecting all countries. Based on a cost-benefit analysis, each state determines its production level and decides voluntarily on its participation in a coalition. Our analysis of the standard static non-cooperative game-theoretic model of coalition formation demonstrates that, under the resulting economic scenario, neither per-capita nor average envy-freeness properties are guaranteed. To foster more equitable cooperation, we define new coalition-formation rules wherein coalesced players maximize the joint utility function subject to constraints that prevent envy. By examining the particular case of a two-country world, we show that, by imposing a suitable aggregate emissions cap, the resulting economic scenario induces a balance of production among agents, thereby generating social equity. The analysis is extended through numerical simulations for a ten-country setting. The results indicate that, while self-enforcing agreements are typically limited to small coalitions, the introduction of equity considerations within the coalition structure significantly increases the number of stable coalitions compared to those obtained in the standard setting.