<p>This article examines the nature and justification of voting rights and their implications for criteria of electoral inclusion. Normative debates on voting rights typically follow two main approaches: the all affected interests view, which holds that anyone affected by political decisions should have a say, and the all subjected view, which argues that all those subject to a polity’s laws should be allowed to participate in shaping them. I explore the underlying rights theories informing these positions, highlighting an overlooked connection between debates on the nature and justification of rights, on the one hand, and the allocation of voting rights, on the other. The analysis shows that all affected interests justifications often stem from an interest-theoretical conception of rights, whereas subjection-sensitive theories align more closely with a will-theoretical understanding. Though I remain cautious about endorsing rigid, context-independent principles for electoral inclusion, I suggest that the all subjected principle better aligns with the nature and justification of the right to vote.</p>