<p>This paper discusses how legitimate expectations should be treated during transitional processes. It examines whether the state may frustrate those expectations which, although legitimate at time T1, are no longer legitimate at time T2 due to changed circumstances. It also discusses the conditions under which those whose expectations may be frustrated during transitional processes should receive compensation. First, we argue that legitimate expectations reflect a legitimate interest in receiving the benefits of the basic structure of society. We then distinguish between legitimate expectations that are protected by rights and those that are not. We argue that while the former type of legitimate expectation may be justifiably frustrated when doing so is necessary to achieve a more just society, the range of cases in which it is permissible to frustrate the latter type of expectation is broader. Finally, we argue that when someone is committed to a particular life plan based on an expectation that was legitimate at T1 but is no longer legitimate at T2 because of changed circumstances, the value of personal autonomy gives rise to a meta-expectation that people will be given some time to adjust their life plans to new circumstances. We also argue that the frustration of expectations that are no longer legitimate during transitions may still require compensation after the change in circumstances, if the agent responsible for creating the expectation frustrates it and the expectation holder has done nothing wrong in relying on it.</p>