<p>Several authors have argued that we ought to have fewer children in order to reduce our contribution to climate change. Proponents of this view generally hold a moderate version of the view, according to which it is still permissible to have one or two children per couple. One recent exception is Chad Vance’s paper “Procreation is Immoral on Environmental Grounds” in this journal, in which he argues that procreation is always, or almost always, morally impermissible. I argue, first, that Vance is mistaken in conceding that his radical position holds only if individual acts of procreation can make a difference, rather than being only a causally insignificantly contribution to collective harm. Instead, given his assumptions, he should hold on to the radical view that we ought to have no children at all. Second, I argue against Vance’s strongest argument for his radical view. Vance argues that procreation harms others, and that obligations to avoid harming rule out the demandingness considerations that are used to support a permission to have one or two children. However, contrary to paradigmatic cases of harming, any procreation-related harms result not only from procreators’ actions, but also from our collective failures to rapidly reduce emissions. This complex causal structure undermines Vance’s rejection of demandingness considerations. I conclude that the moderate view that we may have one or two children per couple survives Vance’s criticism.</p>