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<p>The concept of reality plays an important role in Hasok Chang’s <i>Realism for Realistic People: A New Pragmatist Philosophy of Science </i>(2022). This discussion note looks closely at Chang’s definition of what is real and his reasons for adopting it. I argue that Chang’s concept of reality is quite loose and may not be a useful notion at all; it is also highly revisionary (but intendedly so) and has several problematic consequences. To me, Chang’s understanding of reality undermines his new pragmatist philosophy of science, and unnecessarily so. His special way of thinking about what is real is clearly to a great extent motivated by his unwillingness to endorse metaphysical realism. But metaphysical realism must in fact be fully compatible with a pragmatism and pluralism much along Chang’s lines (intellectual attitudes for which I feel much sympathy). I attempt to show that Chang’s arguments against metaphysical realism do not have the force that he ascribes to them. We do not have to think of a totally mind-independent reality as something beyond rational thought, nor do we have to think of it as necessarily including pre-figured objects, properties, and relations.</p>

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Discussion Note: Hasok Chang and the Concept of Reality

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月29日

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  • Anders Pettersson

摘要

The concept of reality plays an important role in Hasok Chang’s Realism for Realistic People: A New Pragmatist Philosophy of Science (2022). This discussion note looks closely at Chang’s definition of what is real and his reasons for adopting it. I argue that Chang’s concept of reality is quite loose and may not be a useful notion at all; it is also highly revisionary (but intendedly so) and has several problematic consequences. To me, Chang’s understanding of reality undermines his new pragmatist philosophy of science, and unnecessarily so. His special way of thinking about what is real is clearly to a great extent motivated by his unwillingness to endorse metaphysical realism. But metaphysical realism must in fact be fully compatible with a pragmatism and pluralism much along Chang’s lines (intellectual attitudes for which I feel much sympathy). I attempt to show that Chang’s arguments against metaphysical realism do not have the force that he ascribes to them. We do not have to think of a totally mind-independent reality as something beyond rational thought, nor do we have to think of it as necessarily including pre-figured objects, properties, and relations.