<p>Ludwik Fleck is renowned for his pioneering contributions to the sociology of scientific knowledge and historicist philosophy of science. However, his emphasis on the importance of paying attention to the actual practice of science and his rejection of normative epistemology enabled him to advance numerous analyses now categorized under the umbrella of the philosophy of scientific practices. This work aims to establish connections between Ludwik Fleck's work and this philosophical tradition. To achieve this, we initially discuss his conceptions of scientific observation and experimentation, comparing them with those of David Gooding. Subsequently, we explore Fleck's triadic conception of cognition and its internal dialectic, drawing parallels with Andrew Pickering's model of conceptual and material practice. Lastly, we examine some metaphysical theses stemming from Fleck's epistemology, particularly concerning truth, relativity, objectivity, and materiality, and relate them to Pickering's pragmatic realism, along with Ian Hacking's philosophy of styles of scientific reasoning.</p>