<p>Decade-long disagreements about the existence of psychological effects such as the social priming effect are not uncommon in Psychology. Controversies over replication results and disputes over replication quality play a large role in sustained worries about the replication crisis in psychology. In this essay, I aim to explore the underlying reasons behind expert disagreements over replication results. After introducing replications as a scientific tool, I delve into exploring normative decisions and values that enter the evaluation process of replications. I begin by distinguishing three epistemic goals for replications and argue that a replication should be evaluated with regard to its intended function. I then argue that the lack of transparency about intended functions often leads to disagreements. More than that, though, I argue that even if the intended function is known, and thereby the standards by which a replication should be judged, it is difficult to determine if a replication is good at testing what it is supposed to test, which further fuels controversies. I argue this is mainly due to the lack of experimental control and the vast unknown of possible moderation effects. Finally, I argue that an expert’s intended function for a replication may also influence the inferences she might draw from results. Ultimately, I advocate for greater transparency and open communication among researchers. This, I hope should help to reframe discussions as disagreements about intentions and motivations rather than a sign of bad research practice or even a crisis.</p>