PFSA: Pseudo Fault Sensitization Attack on Logic Locking via Key-invalidation
摘要
The decoupling of integrated circuit design and manufacturing has raised significant concerns about intellectual property (IP) piracy, unauthorized overproduction, and security vulnerabilities. Logic locking technology, a countermeasure that integrates key-controlled gates into circuit netlists, ensures functionality only with the correct key. However, various attacks have exposed vulnerabilities in these techniques, prompting efforts to enhance security. This paper introduces the Pseudo Fault Sensitization Attack (PFSA) based on the key-invalidating(KI)-ATPG algorithm, which efficiently bypasses existing defenses. KI-ATPG enhances the traditional ATPG algorithm’s X-filling capability, minimizing fault injections by leveraging logic blocking to invalidate key bits. By analyzing ideal and pseudo-fault responses, PFSA recovers keys with high accuracy. Experimental results demonstrate that PFSA significantly achieved a reduction of 29.17% to 75.19% in the required fault injections, thereby lowering the cost and time of attacks, while significantly improving attack efficiency.