<p>Physical side channels arise because electronic devices unintentionally emit measurable physical signals that correlate with their internal computations. While traditional side-channel research has extensively explored power-based attacks that exploit variations in current consumption, recent studies suggest that chip impedance, fundamentally related to power characteristics, can also be leveraged as a side channel. Impedance-based side-channel analysis exploits variations in intrinsic impedance across different logic states, enabling the extraction of sensitive information from computing systems. However, a comparative study between impedance side channels and conventional power side channels remains largely unexplored. In this study, we present a comprehensive comparative analysis between these two side-channel vectors, assessing their efficacy in extracting cryptographic keys from memory during Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) operations. Our findings demonstrate that impedance analysis exhibits higher potential in certain attack scenarios where power side-channel analysis fails to provide reliable results. This work highlights the need for a deeper analysis of impedance-based leakage and its implications for cryptographic security.</p>