Scholarlink

<p>Why do creators sometimes act as firms, internalizing the realization of their work, while in other settings they delegate realization to market intermediaries or operate under hierarchical employment? We develop an analytical framework in which creators choose how to organize realization when contracts are imperfectly enforceable and limits on contractual payments constrain transfers to creators. Delegation can reduce coordination burdens by shifting realization to established intermediaries, but may fail to meet creators’ participation constraints, making self-integration an endogenous response to contracting limitations. The framework highlights how organizational choice depends not only on coordination costs, but also on the feasibility of contractual transfer and the timing of diffusion. We illustrate the model using the history of Western classical music, where composition and realization are technologically distinct yet jointly required for value creation, yielding a transparent make-or-buy setting. The framework is consistent with the historical evolution from salaried employment under patronage, to entrepreneurial self-organization as markets expanded under weak copyright, and ultimately to delegation under mature intermediation and contracting. It also clarifies why composers sometimes sequenced dissemination—using performance before publication—when the timing of diffusion could not be governed through contract. Similar trade-offs shape creator-intermediary relationships in contemporary creative markets.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Creators as firms: the organization of creative production

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月17日

查看全文
  • Karol J. Borowiecki,
  • Marc T. Law

摘要

Why do creators sometimes act as firms, internalizing the realization of their work, while in other settings they delegate realization to market intermediaries or operate under hierarchical employment? We develop an analytical framework in which creators choose how to organize realization when contracts are imperfectly enforceable and limits on contractual payments constrain transfers to creators. Delegation can reduce coordination burdens by shifting realization to established intermediaries, but may fail to meet creators’ participation constraints, making self-integration an endogenous response to contracting limitations. The framework highlights how organizational choice depends not only on coordination costs, but also on the feasibility of contractual transfer and the timing of diffusion. We illustrate the model using the history of Western classical music, where composition and realization are technologically distinct yet jointly required for value creation, yielding a transparent make-or-buy setting. The framework is consistent with the historical evolution from salaried employment under patronage, to entrepreneurial self-organization as markets expanded under weak copyright, and ultimately to delegation under mature intermediation and contracting. It also clarifies why composers sometimes sequenced dissemination—using performance before publication—when the timing of diffusion could not be governed through contract. Similar trade-offs shape creator-intermediary relationships in contemporary creative markets.