<p>The value of information goods to consumers can increase gradually as users accumulate knowledge through continued use. This form of valuation enhancement is pervasive in markets for information goods, yet it has received limited scholarly attention. We develop a two-period game-theoretic model to examine whether, and how, valuation enhancement and network effects jointly shape the optimal pricing strategies of a monopolistic vendor. The leasing model is traditionally regarded as more profitable than the selling model because it mitigates the time-inconsistency problem inherent in the selling model. Our analysis, however, reveals a contrasting result. When both valuation enhancement and network effects are sufficiently strong, the selling model can outperform the leasing model, even in the presence of time inconsistency. Network effects favor the selling model because early adopters expand the user base, thereby increasing the value of the product for subsequent buyers. Although network effects alone are insufficient to overturn the profitability ranking, valuation enhancement induces the monopolistic vendor to set a lower initial price and attract greater demand under the selling model. This expanded adoption, in turn, amplifies network effects, ultimately enabling the selling model to dominate in terms of profitability.</p>