Scholarlink

<p>The literature on experimental tax and regulatory compliance has highlighted significant advantages associated with competitive audit selection mechanisms (ASMs) predicated on differences in estimated undeclared incomes among taxpayers. This paper explores the potential negative consequences of competitive ASMs in situations where authorities lack an unbiased indicator of these differences. Through a laboratory experiment, we demonstrate that asymmetric information between taxpayers and tax authorities can diminish compliance and exacerbate inequality within competitive ASMs. Our findings underscore the need for caution concerning the perceived benefits of competitive ASMs and emphasize the importance of allocating resources to mitigate income heterogeneity among groups subject to competitive audit selection.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

A competitive audit selection mechanism with incomplete information

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月22日

查看全文
  • Miloš Fišar,
  • Ondřej Krčál,
  • Jiří Špalek,
  • Rostislav Staněk,
  • James Tremewan

摘要

The literature on experimental tax and regulatory compliance has highlighted significant advantages associated with competitive audit selection mechanisms (ASMs) predicated on differences in estimated undeclared incomes among taxpayers. This paper explores the potential negative consequences of competitive ASMs in situations where authorities lack an unbiased indicator of these differences. Through a laboratory experiment, we demonstrate that asymmetric information between taxpayers and tax authorities can diminish compliance and exacerbate inequality within competitive ASMs. Our findings underscore the need for caution concerning the perceived benefits of competitive ASMs and emphasize the importance of allocating resources to mitigate income heterogeneity among groups subject to competitive audit selection.