<p>Is it necessary to apply a distinct conception and framework of responsibility to address structural injustice, one that differs from those used for interactional injustice? The answer this paper presents is both yes and no. While a distinct conceptual and normative framework is indeed necessary to ameliorate structural wrongs, most real-world injustices require a more nuanced and integrated understanding of responsibility. Drawing on Iris Marion Young’s pioneering account of responsibility for structural injustice and its critiques, I argue that existing frameworks for interactional injustice cannot be extended to structural contexts. The argument unfolds in three steps. First, I demonstrate that there are compelling normative and practical reasons to propose a distinct conception of responsibility for structural injustice, and contend that critiques of Young have ultimately failed to undermine its core rationale. Second, I argue that neither Young’s proposal nor her critics offer a sufficiently practicable account for addressing structural harm, as real-world injustices are often hybrid in nature, involving both structural and interactional dimensions. I develop this claim through a novel typology of what I call <i>quasi-structural injustice</i>. Finally, I advance a holistic account as a pragmatic alternative. This approach recognises the conceptual distinction between structural and interactional injustices but rejects their analytical separation, understanding them instead as interdependent dimensions of a single, complex political reality.</p>