<p>This article introduces the Paradox of Compensation, a challenge for theories of moral obligation. The central question is how demands for compensation can be legitimate—as they often seem to be—even when the duty-bearer is justified in setting the relevant duty aside. I argue that the moral frameworks developed by R. Jay Wallace’s and Stephen Darwall fail to resolve this paradox because they are committed to Rationalism, the view that moral obligations depend on the duty-bearer’s having decisive reason to comply. As a result, these theories struggle to give a coherent account of cases where compensation appears appropriate despite justified noncompliance. To address this difficulty, I propose an Anti-rationalist alternative. On my proposal, compensation can be legitimate in such cases because it reflects the persistence of the deontic relationship between the two poles of a bipolar claim, even when the duty is outweighed. I contend that this explanation is available only if we reject traditional Rationalist models of moral obligation, on which obligations are fully determined by the duty-bearer’s reasons.</p>