<p>Monuments, objects, and even individuals, can be interpreted as symbols of freedom (e.g. the statue of liberty, the historical figure of Nelson Mandela). But can freedom itself have symbolic value (and unfreedom symbolic disvalue)? Standardly, freedom has symbolic value when having a degree of freedom or certain particular freedoms symbolically represents something else of value (e.g. equality, the dignity and status of citizenship). The paper offers an analysis of freedom’s symbolic value and illustrates the import of such an analysis for issues of political morality. I proceed by discussing three cases. <i>Mandela’s Liberation</i> highlights the relevance of symbolic value in contexts of oppression, explicating the symbolism of Mandela’s regained freedom in terms of prefiguration. <i>Arranged Marriage</i> discusses Scanlon’s seminal example of the symbolic value of the freedom to choose whom to marry, which illustrates how freedom’s symbolism can be grounded in the cultural understanding of a practice (that of marriage). <i>Party Meetings</i> examines the symbolic value of the political liberties (and related freedoms), explaining how the part-whole connection that defines freedom’s constitutive value can be symbolically interpreted by means of a synecdochal representation.</p>