<p>This paper critically examines the figure of the saint in Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory and identifies several problems with her conceptualization. While Zagzebski presents saints as moral exemplars primarily characterized by charity, her account leaves unresolved issues: saints appear unrealistically idealized, flaws seem excluded from sainthood, the mechanism for emotional emulation remains unclear, and the approach risks promoting elitism and excessive self-reliance. I argue that these problems stem from an underdeveloped account of the saint’s spirituality. Drawing on Christian theological traditions, particularly Aquinas’s understanding of grace, and close narrative analysis of saintly lives such as that of St. Francis of Assisi, I propose that saints be understood primarily through their spiritual relationship with the divine, rather than through their moral excellence. While maintaining the exemplary role of saints, this reframing avoids perfectionism, accommodates moral flaws, and can render emotional emulation more psychologically and ethically feasible. While this spiritual grounding may limit the applicability of exemplarism to secular contexts, it reveals that sainthood is not about being “practically perfect in every way” but about participating in a spiritual life that transforms the moral self. This reconceptualization suggests broader implications for virtue ethics, indicating that emulation must account for an exemplar’s inner spiritual architecture. Furthermore, this analysis points to the importance of understanding exemplars within their proper cultural contexts.</p>