<p>Linda Zagzebski’s groundbreaking book <i>Exemplarist Moral Theory</i> has inspired new attention to the use of moral exemplars in moral education. Zagzebski argues that admiration for moral exemplars has a crucial role to play in the development of moral virtue. It is through admiration that we come to identify moral exemplars. Moreover, it is through our admiration for exemplars that we come to identify what moral virtue consists of and also to develop the motivation to act virtuously. My aim in this paper is not to argue against Zagzebski’s claims about these roles that exemplars play in moral education but instead to argue for an additional, important role that moral exemplars in helping to form a sense of who is and who is not a fellow member of the moral community. I will argue for this by drawing on literature from the ethics of commemoration, classics and social science. In presenting someone as a moral exemplar, we declare them to be a highly valued member of the moral community. Conversely, when members of marginalized groups are rarely presented as moral exemplars, this reinforces the idea that they are at best second-class members of the moral community. Similarly, holding up oppressors as moral exemplars also serves to reinforce the idea that victims of oppression should not be considered full members of the moral community. Despite these negative uses of moral exemplars, I will argue that exemplar narratives can also play a positive role in expanding our conception of who should be included in the moral community. I will finish by considering the implications of this argument for the use of moral exemplars in moral education.</p>