<p>The co-existent cause (<i>sahabhūhetu</i>) is a type of cause proposed by the Sarvāstivāda school, which arises simultaneously with its effects. However, there is significant disagreement on how define a <i>dharma</i> as the co-existent cause of its effects. One of the central debates revolves around how to interpret the <i>common effects</i> (<i>*ekaphala</i>) criterion employed by the Vaibhāṣikas, especially Saṃghabhadra, to define the co-existent cause. Previous studies have largely overlooked Saṃghabhadra’s nuanced application of the concept of <i>common effects</i> when discussing specific cases, leading to various misunderstandings. In this article, I begin by analyzing two main scenarios in which Saṃghabhadra applies the concept in question, identifying two distinct usages: common subsequent effects and common simultaneous effects. I then propose an integrated understanding, according to which Saṃghabhadra in fact maintains that if a <i>dharma</i> is the co-existent cause of another by virtue of satisfying the <i>common effects</i> criterion, it must share both common subsequent effects and common simultaneous effects with that <i>dharma</i>. On this interpretation, all cases in which Saṃghabhadra explicitly applies the <i>common effects</i> criterion to define co-existent causes can be coherently explained and no counterexamples arise under this understanding. Finally, I extend this understanding to the third scenario and demonstrate its coherence in that context as well.</p>

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How to Define Sahabhūhetu: Rethinking Saṃghabhadra’s Use of the Concept of Common Effects

  • Jincheng Li

摘要

The co-existent cause (sahabhūhetu) is a type of cause proposed by the Sarvāstivāda school, which arises simultaneously with its effects. However, there is significant disagreement on how define a dharma as the co-existent cause of its effects. One of the central debates revolves around how to interpret the common effects (*ekaphala) criterion employed by the Vaibhāṣikas, especially Saṃghabhadra, to define the co-existent cause. Previous studies have largely overlooked Saṃghabhadra’s nuanced application of the concept of common effects when discussing specific cases, leading to various misunderstandings. In this article, I begin by analyzing two main scenarios in which Saṃghabhadra applies the concept in question, identifying two distinct usages: common subsequent effects and common simultaneous effects. I then propose an integrated understanding, according to which Saṃghabhadra in fact maintains that if a dharma is the co-existent cause of another by virtue of satisfying the common effects criterion, it must share both common subsequent effects and common simultaneous effects with that dharma. On this interpretation, all cases in which Saṃghabhadra explicitly applies the common effects criterion to define co-existent causes can be coherently explained and no counterexamples arise under this understanding. Finally, I extend this understanding to the third scenario and demonstrate its coherence in that context as well.