<p>This paper presents a case study of the application of Buddhist logic based on Dharmapāla’s commentary on the <i>Catuḥśataka</i> 9.4, i.e., Sect.&#xa0;1.4 of <i>Dasheng guangbailun shilun</i>. First, this paper provides a complete translation of Sect.&#xa0;1.4 with philosophical analysis. The adversary’s argument, “Space, etc., are permanent because of not being produced,” is rejected by Dharmapāla due to the fallacy of <i>dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana</i>, that is, the reason proves instead that space, etc., are not existent. In the meantime, the fallacy of <i>āśrayāsiddha</i> is not incurred, because the reason “not being produced” merely excludes the property of “being produced” and therefore its basis/subject can be not existent in reality. Second, this paper shows that Xuanzang and his successors are under the influence of Dharmapāla in this regard. When arguing against the subject admitted by the adversary, they emphasize that the fallacy of <i>āśrayāsiddha</i> is not incurred if the reason merely excludes or negates some property without affirming any others. In addition, the strategy of two negative usages is applied to not only reasons, but also properties to be proved, and similar examples. However, the strategy of <i>tabiliang</i> seems popular in the East Asian Buddhism through the influence of Xuanzang. Third, there are similarities and differences between Dharmapāla’s thought and Dharmakīrti’s and his successors’ regarding the pertinent issues. Dharmapāla’s thought seems probably relevant to post-Dharmapāla thinkers’. It is hoped that this paper will contribute to the study of Dharmapāla and to our understanding of Buddhist logic and its development.</p>