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<p>Whether <i>Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika</i>s intend to reject self-awareness on the conventional level has been a subject of vigorous scholarly debate for centuries. However, the underlying question—whether the <i>Prāsaṅgika</i> refutations of self-awareness remain valid when applied at the conventional level—has not received sufficient academic attention. This paper examines this issue by analyzing the refutations presented in the <i>Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya</i> and the <i>Bodhicaryāvatāra</i>, and evaluates the extent to which the <i>Vijñānavādin</i> position can defend self-awareness, the cornerstone of their logico-epistemological theory, against <i>Prāsaṅgika</i> critiques.</p>

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On the Prāsaṅgika Refutations of Self-awareness

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月15日

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  • King Chung Lo

摘要

Whether Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas intend to reject self-awareness on the conventional level has been a subject of vigorous scholarly debate for centuries. However, the underlying question—whether the Prāsaṅgika refutations of self-awareness remain valid when applied at the conventional level—has not received sufficient academic attention. This paper examines this issue by analyzing the refutations presented in the Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya and the Bodhicaryāvatāra, and evaluates the extent to which the Vijñānavādin position can defend self-awareness, the cornerstone of their logico-epistemological theory, against Prāsaṅgika critiques.