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<p>The disagreement between <i>sākārajñānavādin</i>s, followers of the theory that cognitions are endowed with a form, and <i>nirākārajñānavādin</i>s, who advocate the theory of formless cognitions, is one of the central disagreements in Indian epistemology. This study focuses on the heretofore understudied position of classical and postclassical Sāṃkhya. The view that can be termed representational realism has been traced by me in all extant classical Sāṃkhya texts. According to these texts, the cognitive subject, be it <i>puruṣa</i> or the intellect (<i>buddhi</i>), experiences the object not directly but through the object’s form assumed by the cognitive faculties. The main evidence is found in the <i>Yuktidīpikā</i>. It explicitly states that all cognitive organs<i>—</i>the senses (<i>buddhīndriya</i>), <i>manas</i>, <i>ahaṃkāra</i>, and <i>buddhi—</i><?sps tjl="20mm?"?><?sps tjl?>sequentially, one after another<i>—</i>take on the form (<i>ākāra</i>, <i>rūpa</i>) of the cognitive object; that <i>puruṣa</i> experiences the world through the <i>buddhi</i>’s forms; and that these forms can only figuratively be ascribed to changeless <i>puruṣa</i>. Also noteworthy is that within Brahmanical <i>darśana</i>s, the <i>Yuktidīpikā</i> is one of the earliest texts that shows familiarity with the <i>nirākāra</i>–<i>sākāra</i> problem; that the <i>Yuktidīpikā</i> mentions the Buddhist opponent’s view that cognitions have the form of their object without trying to refute it; and that this commentary incites the Naiyāyika Bhaṭṭa Jayanta to say that the Sāṃkhya standpoint does not differ much from the <i>sākārajñānavāda</i> of the Buddhists. Though it is hardly possible to definitely identify the Sāṃkhyas as <i>sākāravādin</i>s or <i>nirākāravādin</i>s, their strong inclination towards the <i>sākāravāda</i> is conspicuous. According to Sāṃkhya, the <i>buddhi</i>’s forms (<i>ākāra</i>, <i>rūpa</i>) become conscious cognitions due to the proximity of <i>puruṣa</i>, from which it follows that cognitions are endowed with a form. The postclassical <i>Sāṃkhyasūtra</i> and <i>Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti</i>, which aimed to revive the classical Sāṃkhya system of thought, confirm that the view that cognitions have a form is Sāṃkhyan.</p>

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Sām.khya’s Standpoint in the Disagreement on Whether Cognitions Have a Form (ākāra)

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    2025年2月26日

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  • Ołena Łucyszyna

摘要

The disagreement between sākārajñānavādins, followers of the theory that cognitions are endowed with a form, and nirākārajñānavādins, who advocate the theory of formless cognitions, is one of the central disagreements in Indian epistemology. This study focuses on the heretofore understudied position of classical and postclassical Sāṃkhya. The view that can be termed representational realism has been traced by me in all extant classical Sāṃkhya texts. According to these texts, the cognitive subject, be it puruṣa or the intellect (buddhi), experiences the object not directly but through the object’s form assumed by the cognitive faculties. The main evidence is found in the Yuktidīpikā. It explicitly states that all cognitive organs—the senses (buddhīndriya), manas, ahaṃkāra, and buddhi—sequentially, one after another—take on the form (ākāra, rūpa) of the cognitive object; that puruṣa experiences the world through the buddhi’s forms; and that these forms can only figuratively be ascribed to changeless puruṣa. Also noteworthy is that within Brahmanical darśanas, the Yuktidīpikā is one of the earliest texts that shows familiarity with the nirākāra–sākāra problem; that the Yuktidīpikā mentions the Buddhist opponent’s view that cognitions have the form of their object without trying to refute it; and that this commentary incites the Naiyāyika Bhaṭṭa Jayanta to say that the Sāṃkhya standpoint does not differ much from the sākārajñānavāda of the Buddhists. Though it is hardly possible to definitely identify the Sāṃkhyas as sākāravādins or nirākāravādins, their strong inclination towards the sākāravāda is conspicuous. According to Sāṃkhya, the buddhi’s forms (ākāra, rūpa) become conscious cognitions due to the proximity of puruṣa, from which it follows that cognitions are endowed with a form. The postclassical Sāṃkhyasūtra and Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti, which aimed to revive the classical Sāṃkhya system of thought, confirm that the view that cognitions have a form is Sāṃkhyan.