‘I Don’t Know’: An Epistemic Analysis of First-Personal Ignorance

Ignorance becomes a philosophical issue when it is first-personal, i.e., x’s awareness about x’s own ignorance. It raises exciting and apparently paradoxical questions about cognition. Keeping first-personal experience of ignorance at the centre, some Indian philosophical schools discuss extensively the nature of ignorance. Vyāsatīrtha from the Dualist school (Dvaita Vedānta), along with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school propound that ignorance belongs to a negative category (abhāvapadārtha) or in other words, that it must be understood as an absence of some cognition. The Non-dualist school (Advaita Vedānta) thinks that ignorance is not an absence of cognition, but a positive entity (bhāvarūpa) that obstructs our cognition. The first group objects for considering ignorance as a positive entity arguing that it leads to the problem of profligacy of ontological entities, whereas the Non-dualists argue that considering ignorance as an absence of cognition leads to contradictions in cases of first-personal experiences of ignorance. In this paper, I present a small segment of the extensive arguments from both sides, alongside two Western philosophical theories that support the views of the Dualists and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Through a critical analysis of these arguments, I demonstrate that, with respect to the specific set of arguments examined, the view of ignorance as an absence of cognition fails to sufficiently account for cases of first-personal experiences of ignorance. In contrast, the Non-dualist conceptualization proves more robust, given its successful applicability to all instances of ignorance.