<p>This paper, first, investigates how the social contract of post-2011 Revolution Tunisia was shaped using a process tracing methodology and, second, investigates the comparative gains/losses of the different considered social actors from this social contract. The social contract is perceived as a product of the prevailing state-society relations which are analyzed based on social and policy coalitions. The actors’ activities and their comparative gains/losses from the resulting social contract are investigated in terms of two broad policy subsystems: competition and welfare. Depending on qualitative data collected from a number of semi-structured interviews and the literature, this research suggests that the post-2011 social contract leaned towards state capture. It was shaped by the democratization process that interacted with several contextual conditions such as political polarization, prevalence of networks of favoritism, strong labor union movement that represented mainly public sector labor, and weaker and fragmentated interest representation of entrepreneurs. The resultant social contract was one where tycoons mainly benefited from lax implementation of laws and regulations without yielding more economic prosperity. Entrepreneurs’ benefits from democratic empowerment of broad-based business associations were overshadowed by high favoritism and fragmentation of business representation. The welfare benefits brought by the strengthened labor organizational representation were largely confined to public sector labor, while private sector labor conditions comparatively deteriorated. Entrepreneurs and private sector labor’s losses were greater in this contract than in the former Ben Ali’s crony capitalist contract, making it even less sustainable than its predecessor.</p>