<p>According to Husserl and Luckmann, the relationship between phenomenology and the human sciences should be the relationship of foundation. Phenomenology acts as the First Philosophy, describing the constitutive laws of the world and providing the universal matrix for the empirical analysis. Some philosophers argue against this approach and, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, claim a more dialogical relation between these two domains of knowledge. However, in Merleau-Ponty’s reasoning, we can find a more radical approach that dissolves the demarcation boundary between phenomenological and empirical inquiries and represents them as the “degrees of the clarification of the same knowledge” about the human being and the world. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that we can conceive the relationship between phenomenology and the human sciences through the idea of the “fundamental homogeneity” in which there are no separated eidetic and inductive modes of investigation, but rather a “movement back and forth from facts to ideas and from ideas to facts”.</p>