Scholarlink

<p>This paper examines the methodological differences between Edith Stein and Eugen Fink in their interpretations of Husserl’s phenomenology. While it is well known that Husserl’s methodology evolved over time and that Stein’s and Fink’s interpretations are both controversial and distinct from one another, what remains unclear– and what this paper seeks to clarify—is how these differences can be precisely defined. Although both thinkers engage with world experience, epoché, and reduction, they do so in fundamentally different ways: Stein focuses on world experience, the problem of the external world, and constitution, whereas Fink investigates the process of constitution itself and the inseparable connection between world experience and reduction. Husserl’s own self-reflections in the early 1930s, particularly on <i>Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy</i>, mark a shift in the understanding of <i>epoché</i> between two generations. By analyzing Stein’s and Fink’s approaches in this context, this paper clarifies how their differing interpretations of the epoché not only shaped their respective versions of phenomenology but also redefined the very relationship between epoché and reduction– shifting the methodological focus from suspending the natural attitude to interrogating the constitutive process itself.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

World Experience – Epoché – Reduction: Methodological Reflections on Edith Stein and Eugen Fink

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年4月11日

查看全文
  • Anna Jani

摘要

This paper examines the methodological differences between Edith Stein and Eugen Fink in their interpretations of Husserl’s phenomenology. While it is well known that Husserl’s methodology evolved over time and that Stein’s and Fink’s interpretations are both controversial and distinct from one another, what remains unclear– and what this paper seeks to clarify—is how these differences can be precisely defined. Although both thinkers engage with world experience, epoché, and reduction, they do so in fundamentally different ways: Stein focuses on world experience, the problem of the external world, and constitution, whereas Fink investigates the process of constitution itself and the inseparable connection between world experience and reduction. Husserl’s own self-reflections in the early 1930s, particularly on Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, mark a shift in the understanding of epoché between two generations. By analyzing Stein’s and Fink’s approaches in this context, this paper clarifies how their differing interpretations of the epoché not only shaped their respective versions of phenomenology but also redefined the very relationship between epoché and reduction– shifting the methodological focus from suspending the natural attitude to interrogating the constitutive process itself.