Husserlian Phenomenology of Limit-Problems: a “‘Geometry’ of Lived Experience”?

The proper way in which limit-problems [Grenzprobleme]—birth, death, dreamless sleep, the “prior to birth” [das vor der Geburt], the “after death” [das nach dem Tod], etc.—can be accessed according to Husserl is by means of so-called “construction” [Konstruktion] or “reconstruction” [Rekonstruktion]. Contrary to what is usually claimed with respect to this method, and therefore the acts it is composed of, this paper will attempt to prove that they do not consist in non-intuitive acts, but rather in intuitive, but non-sensible acts. In other words, the aforementioned acts of construction consist in categorial acts. More specifically, they represent acts akin to the ones involved in the constitution of exact material essences of a qualitative (the “pure” red, the “pure” blue …) or of a geometrical kind (a triangle, a chiliagon …): both the acts involved in the constitution of elementary exact essences, or acts of idealization, and the acts involved in the constitution of derived exact essences, or acts of deriving. However, the acceptance of such acts of construction suggests a serious reconsideration of some of the basic tenets of Husserlian phenomenology. Indeed, it challenges the idea that phenomenology is an eidetic science of inexact—morphological, descriptive …—material essences, namely the essence of a subjective sphere (the essence of consciousness, the essence of ego …); in fact, it turns phenomenology, at least partially, into something Husserl explicitly repudiates on multiple occasions: a “geometry” of lived experience. It is thus important to determine whether these acts of construction should be integrated into Husserlian phenomenology, and, if yes, how they should be integrated into it. Providing an indication of this will be the ultimate goal of this paper.