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<p>In <i>The Idea of Phenomenology</i>, Husserl presents two different senses of the distinction between the immanent and the transcendent: a mereological sense and an epistemic sense. The failure to distinguish between these two senses leads to what he calls a “fatal mistake,” namely, the assumption that what is given absolutely in the epistemic sense is restricted only to what is immanent in the mereological sense. This restriction prevents overcoming the challenge of transcendence. This paper examines the philosophical challenge Husserl identifies in relation to awareness of transcendence, as well as the demand for the absolute givenness of transcendence as a way to overcome it. <i>The Idea of Phenomenology</i> is read here as a critique of Husserl’s earlier position in the <i>Logical Investigations</i>—a critique whose central point is the recognition that evidence (Evidenz) is not the correspondence between the contents of empty and fulfilled experiences, but rather the givenness of transcendence itself. In addition, the paper proposes two readings: according to one, the epistemic sense of the distinction between the immanent and the transcendent replaces the mereological sense; according to the other, the epistemic sense is maintained alongside the mereological one. It also examines the metaphysical implications for the relation between these two senses of the distinction.</p>

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The Fatal Mistake in the Logical Investigations

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月11日

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  • Meir Kurzweil

摘要

In The Idea of Phenomenology, Husserl presents two different senses of the distinction between the immanent and the transcendent: a mereological sense and an epistemic sense. The failure to distinguish between these two senses leads to what he calls a “fatal mistake,” namely, the assumption that what is given absolutely in the epistemic sense is restricted only to what is immanent in the mereological sense. This restriction prevents overcoming the challenge of transcendence. This paper examines the philosophical challenge Husserl identifies in relation to awareness of transcendence, as well as the demand for the absolute givenness of transcendence as a way to overcome it. The Idea of Phenomenology is read here as a critique of Husserl’s earlier position in the Logical Investigations—a critique whose central point is the recognition that evidence (Evidenz) is not the correspondence between the contents of empty and fulfilled experiences, but rather the givenness of transcendence itself. In addition, the paper proposes two readings: according to one, the epistemic sense of the distinction between the immanent and the transcendent replaces the mereological sense; according to the other, the epistemic sense is maintained alongside the mereological one. It also examines the metaphysical implications for the relation between these two senses of the distinction.