<p>This article examines Stumpf’s and Blaustein’s accounts of Husserlian eidetics through a combined historical and systematic lens. Historically, it explores the intellectual and personal connections linking Stumpf, Blaustein, and Husserl, bringing into focus a little-known encounter between Blaustein and Stumpf, and discussing the possibility of Stumpf’s impact on Blaustein in his reading of Husserl. Systematically, it treats their engagements with Husserl’s thought as exemplifying two opposed strategies toward eidetics: limitation (Stumpf) and elimination (Blaustein). It is argued that Stumpf’s critique culminates in a form of minimal eidetics, whereas Blaustein’s position amounts to a radical de-eidetization of research. Both lines of critique, however, rest on some misunderstandings concerning Husserl’s phenomenology which ultimately remains unaffected by them. The study explores Husserl’s conception of eidetics, its methodological foundations, and its place within phenomenology. Next, it examines Stumpf’s doctrine of “regional axioms” as presented in his posthumously published <i>Erkenntnislehre</i> and his minimalist construal of eidetic knowledge in contrast to Husserl’s. Furthermore, it turns to Blaustein’s critique, focusing on his doubts about eidetic cognition and his attempt to replace eidetics with a theory of types. The study concludes with a comparative assessment of both positions, highlighting their points of convergence as well as their fundamental divergences.</p>