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<p>In a late manuscript, Husserl explicitly addresses the problem of depersonalization. Depersonalization is described as a rupture in a certain layer of experience, which, however, does not touch the fundamental unity of the underlying genesis. After a brief recapitulation of historical approaches to depersonalization, I’ll come to comment on this passage. To assess Husserl’s contribution to the clinical understanding, and more specifically to the phenomenology of depersonalization, it is essential to understand his concept of personhood. In Husserl’s account of personhood, we can identify a tension between the unity and continuity of the transcendental genesis of the personal <i>ego</i> and the self-alienation and de-presentation at play in this genesis. Drawing on the French reception of Husserl’s phenomenology and Eugen Fink’s notion of de-presentation, I suggest that transcendental temporalization not only cannot function as a fail-safe in the case of depersonalization but may even be at the core of the loss of the sense of personhood. To account for the fact of personalization, one must re-evaluate the notion of empathy in the relation of the self to itself.</p>

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Depersonalization, Alienation, and Depresentation in Husserl and Beyond

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年1月18日

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  • István Fazakas

摘要

In a late manuscript, Husserl explicitly addresses the problem of depersonalization. Depersonalization is described as a rupture in a certain layer of experience, which, however, does not touch the fundamental unity of the underlying genesis. After a brief recapitulation of historical approaches to depersonalization, I’ll come to comment on this passage. To assess Husserl’s contribution to the clinical understanding, and more specifically to the phenomenology of depersonalization, it is essential to understand his concept of personhood. In Husserl’s account of personhood, we can identify a tension between the unity and continuity of the transcendental genesis of the personal ego and the self-alienation and de-presentation at play in this genesis. Drawing on the French reception of Husserl’s phenomenology and Eugen Fink’s notion of de-presentation, I suggest that transcendental temporalization not only cannot function as a fail-safe in the case of depersonalization but may even be at the core of the loss of the sense of personhood. To account for the fact of personalization, one must re-evaluate the notion of empathy in the relation of the self to itself.