<p>In “Surrogate Wars,” Autumn Fiester hypothesizes that conflicts between health care providers and surrogates about the use of life sustaining treatments (LSTs) often arise from differences in deeply held values about best interests and continuation of life. While Fiester’s view offers much food for thought, this response raises three concerns about its plausibility - and therefore its usefulness in resolving conflicts about LST. First, Fiester’s descriptions of health care providers’ best interests values (BIV) and surrogates’ life-continuation values (LCV) fail to recognize the diverse range of commitments these individuals may have. Second, patients and surrogates who articulate LCVs often do so with the hope of achieving a different underlying goal or motivation. Third, her claims about the “hegemony” of providers’ values over those of others seem to mischaracterize the majority of clinician-surrogate interactions; there are good reasons to believe that health care providers generally seek to respect patients’ and surrogates’ values and only interject their own in extreme cases. A more nuanced version of Fiester’s view might provide insights that could help clinicians and clinical ethics consultants resolve some of the challenging disagreements about provision of LST.</p>

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Getting To the Bottom of Surrogate Skirmishes: A Response To Fiester’s “Surrogate Wars”

  • Janet Malek

摘要

In “Surrogate Wars,” Autumn Fiester hypothesizes that conflicts between health care providers and surrogates about the use of life sustaining treatments (LSTs) often arise from differences in deeply held values about best interests and continuation of life. While Fiester’s view offers much food for thought, this response raises three concerns about its plausibility - and therefore its usefulness in resolving conflicts about LST. First, Fiester’s descriptions of health care providers’ best interests values (BIV) and surrogates’ life-continuation values (LCV) fail to recognize the diverse range of commitments these individuals may have. Second, patients and surrogates who articulate LCVs often do so with the hope of achieving a different underlying goal or motivation. Third, her claims about the “hegemony” of providers’ values over those of others seem to mischaracterize the majority of clinician-surrogate interactions; there are good reasons to believe that health care providers generally seek to respect patients’ and surrogates’ values and only interject their own in extreme cases. A more nuanced version of Fiester’s view might provide insights that could help clinicians and clinical ethics consultants resolve some of the challenging disagreements about provision of LST.