<p>Perspectivist positions have been proposed in physics, notably in order to address the interpretive difficulties of quantum mechanics. Recently, some versions of perspectivism have also been proposed in general philosophy of science to account for the plurality of scientific practice. Both kinds of views share the rejection of what they metaphorically call the “view from nowhere”. However, beyond this superficial similarity, they are very different: while quantum perspectivism entertains a concrete notion of perspective associated with individual agents or systems or concrete contexts, perspectival realism adopts a more abstract notion associated with explanatory aims or conceptual schemes. The aim of this paper is to clarify what is at stake with perspectivism <i>in general</i>. The general notion of a perspective, as well as the various attitudes one can entertained towards them, are characterised using the concepts of harmless contradiction and cross-perspectival accessibility. A taxonomy of positions ranging from absolutism to relativism is proposed on this basis. Then the framework is applied to quantum perspectivism and perspectival realism to show its fruitfulness. Finally, I argue that abstract versions of perspectivism are bound to be metaphysically weaker than concrete versions.</p>